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1Abstract
Earnings di⁄erentials between men and women have experienced a
stable convergence during the 1980s, following a process started in the
late 1970s. However, in the 1990s the convergence has almost stopped.
The ￿rst objective of the paper is to evaluate if discrimination, de￿ned
as explicit prejudice, may have a role in explaining this slowdown in the
converge. The second objective is to assess whether the prediction of a de-
crease in the proportion of prejudiced employers implied by the Becker￿ s
model of taste discrimination is taking place and if so at what speed.
These objectives are achieved by developing and estimating a search model
of the labor market with matching, bargaining, employer￿ s prejudice and
worker￿ s participation decisions. The results show that the proportion of
prejudiced employers is estimated to be decreasing at an increasing speed,
going from about 69% in 1985 to about 32% in 2005. Therefore prejudice
does not seem a relevant factor in explaining the slower convergence be-
tween male and female earnings in the 1990s. The results are consistent
with the Becker￿ s model of taste discrimination if one is willing to assume
a very slow adjustment process.
JEL Classi￿cation: C51; J7; J64
Keywords: Gender Di⁄erentials; Discrimination; Search Models; Maxi-
mum Likelihood Estimation; Structural Estimation..
21 Introduction
Gender di⁄erentials in the labor market have experienced a stable reduction in
the 1980s, following a process started in the late 1970s. Figure 1 shows this
trend on hourly earnings, one of the main indicators used to evaluate gender
di⁄erentials in the labor market. In 1981 women were earning on average 37.9%
less than men, compared to 29.2% in 1990 and to about 20.7% in 1993. The
convergence between male and female earnings persists after controlling for stan-
dard human capital characteristics: the conditional di⁄erential decreased from
more than 36.9% in 1981 to 27.8% in 1991.
However, during the 1990s this convergence has almost stopped. The evi-
dence is quite robust and is documented in the literature: Blau and Kahn 2004
use PSID data and a careful treatment of labor market experience to ￿nd a sim-
ilar result over the 1979-1998 period; Eckstein and Nagypal 2004 ￿nd it using
yearly income data from CPS over the 1961-2002 period; Fortin and Lemieux
2000 use CPS data and relate this trend with trends in the wage distribution.
Also the simple male/female median earnings ratio, regularly published by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, produces a similar picture.
The ￿rst objective of this paper is to evaluate whether discrimination, de-
￿ned as explicit prejudice, may have a role in explaining this slowdown in the
converge between male and female earnings. The question is relevant because
the convergence in the 1980s has been interpreted by some authors as evidence
that gender discrimination in the labor market was becoming irrelevant (O￿ Neill
2003). Policy implications are quite di⁄erent depending on whether the slow-
down is due to barriers that do not allow for an e¢ cient use of female labor,
such as prejudice, or to other labor market institutions and out of labor market
factors.
The second objective of the paper is theoretical and closely related to one
of the most common de￿nition of discrimination used in the literature: dis-
crimination de￿ned as explicit prejudice of employers against women due to
preference. This is the taste discrimination idea developed by Gary Becker
(1957, 1971) and is the form of discrimination that will be studied in this pa-
per. Becker￿ s model of taste discrimination has been very in￿ uential but also
strongly criticized because, as Arrow 1973 puts it, the ￿model predicts the ab-
sence of the phenomenon it was designed to explain.￿ The issue is that only
the least discriminatory employers survive in the long run, eventually leading
to the disappearance of discrimination. Becker￿ s answer to this criticism has
been that there is not an in￿nite supply of "entrepreneurial ability", so there
is not really free-entry of employers with unprejudiced tastes. Moreover, labor
markets are not necessarily perfectly competitive and, as for example Heckman
1998 points out, search frictions may give employers monopsony power slowing
down this adjustment process. The second objective of this paper is then to
provide an estimate of the proportion of prejudiced employers over time to de-
termine whether the prediction of the model, a reduction in the proportion of
prejudiced employers, is actually taking place and at what speed.
The paper develops a search model with matching, bargaining and labor
3market participation decisions in presence of two types of employers (prejudiced
and unprejudiced) and two types of workers (men and women). Additional het-
erogeneity is introduced by match-speci￿c productivity. This structure solves
the fundamental identi￿cation problem of the empirical literature on discrim-
ination: how to separate the impact of prejudice from the impact of other
group-speci￿c characteristics, such as unobserved productivity di⁄erences. This
identi￿cation strategy is detailed and proved in Flabbi 2005, which builds on
Flinn and Heckman 1982. The main intuition is to exploit the peculiar impact
of prejudice - parametrized by the proportion of prejudiced employers and by
their disutility from hiring women - on the shape of the accepted earnings distri-
bution. The model also allows for a variety of equilibrium e⁄ects, in particular
the bargaining structure generates spillover e⁄ects. Spillover e⁄ects imply that
in equilibrium unprejudiced employers wage discriminate women despite not
receiving any disutility from hiring them.
The model is estimated on hourly earnings and monthly unemployment dura-
tions extracted from Current Population Survey (CPS) data. Some restrictions
on race, education and age are imposed on the estimation sample to guarantee
the ex-ante homogeneity assumed by the theoretical model. Various speci￿ca-
tions are estimated to account for family characteristics like marital status and
presence of young children.
The proportion of prejudiced employers is estimated to be decreasing at an
increasing speed: from 69% in 1985 to 57% in 1995 to 32% in 2005. A counter-
factual experiment is implemented in order to isolate the impact of prejudiced
behavior over time on relevant labor market variables. The main conclusions
of the paper are that prejudice does not seem a major factor in the slowdown
of the convergence of earnings between men and women and that the estimates
are broadly consistent with the predictions of the taste discrimination model if
one is willing to allow for a very slow adjustment process over time.
In terms of the empirical search literature that focuses on discrimination,
the paper is most closely related to Flabbi 2005, Bowlus and Eckstein 2002 and
Bowlus 1997. The ￿rst contribution develops the methodology to separately
identify productivity di⁄erences and discrimination utilized in this paper, pro-
vides a ￿rst set of estimates on one cross-section (CPS 1995), and implements
policy experiments about a¢ rmative action and equal pay policies. Di⁄erently
from the current paper, it does not focus on over time changes and does not allow
for a labor market participation decision. Bowlus and Eckstein 2002 focuses on
race discrimination and it is the ￿rst contribution which exploits the structure
of a search model to propose an identi￿cation strategy to jointly estimate pro-
ductivity di⁄erences and prejudiced behavior. Finally, Bowlus 1997 separately
estimates a search model on male and female data allowing for a labor market
participation decision. Her model, though, does not allow for the presence of
discrimination and as a result most of the wage di⁄erential is estimated to be
due to productivity di⁄erences.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, section
3 speci￿es the likelihood function and discusses the identi￿cation, section 4
4presents the data, section 5 comments on the estimation results and the coun-
terfactual experiments, sections 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The model is characterized by four main ingredients: a labor market with search
frictions; an employment relation based on employer-employee match-speci￿c
productivity; a wage setting obtained by bargaining; and workers and employ-
ers￿types de￿ned by prejudiced preferences. There are two types of workers
- Women () and Men () - and two types of employers - Prejudiced ()
and Unprejudiced (). Following Becker￿ s taste discrimination idea, prejudiced
employers receive a disutility  from hiring female workers.
The search-matching-bargaining framework is an empirically tractable way
to characterize labor market dynamics and has been used by, among others,
Eckstein and Wolpin 1995 to study internal rate of return to schooling and Flinn
2005 to study the impact of mandatory minimum wage policies. Types de￿ned
by prejudice have been used in a huge number of applications and theoretical
contributions. In the context of the estimation of a search model, they have
been used by Bowlus and Eckstein 2002 and Flabbi 2005.
2.1 The Environment
The model is in continuous time and agents are in￿nitely lived. Workers can
be in one of three di⁄erent states: employment, unemployment and nonpartic-
ipation in the labor market. The introduction of the nonparticipation state is
not standard in the literature: for example, all the works previously mentioned
assume only two states, employment and unemployment. However, the par-
ticipation rate of women has changed much more than the participation rate
of men in the last twenty years. Figure 2 reports some statistics about this
dynamic: the gender di⁄erentials in the participation and employment rates.
Conditioning on participation, there are no signi￿cant di⁄erences in the em-
ployment rates between men and women. On the contrary, participation rates
were quite di⁄erent at the beginning of the 1980s (about a 30% di⁄erential) and
despite converging over the whole period a 17.7% di⁄erential persists in 2005. A
meaningful comparison across years should therefore take into account, at least
in part, this phenomenon.
The following notation is used to indicate the proportion of the population
in each state (Rate) and the present discounted value corresponding to each
state (Value):
State Rate Value
Employment   [()]
Unemployment  
NonParticipation (1 ¬ ) 
5where () denotes the ￿ ow wage of a match that generates a ￿ ow produc-
tivity . Each rate is computed with respect to the entire population, therefore
employment and unemployment rates conditioning on labor market participa-
tion are  and . A subscript will denote types: for example the value for a
woman working at an unprejudiced employer is denoted by  [ ()]
Workers receive a ￿ ow utility value  ￿ () when non-participating in the
labor market.1 The assumption is that leisure, public goods, or other factors
generate positive utility for individuals that voluntarily decide not to supply
labor. This implies that individuals with a su¢ ciently low value of nonpartici-
pation will enter the labor market, the others will stay out. The model is quite
stylized in this respect because of the lack of transition to (and duration in)
nonparticipation.2 However, the presence of a nonparticipation state allows for
some interesting equilibrium e⁄ects.
Once individuals decide to supply labor, they randomly meet employers fol-
lowing a Poisson process characterized by an exogenous arrival rate ￿: Once a
worker and an employer meet, their types and the productivity value speci￿c to
the match are revealed. Productivity is denoted by  ￿ (). Upon observing
types and productivity, the two agents engage in bargaining to determine wages
and then they decide whether to accept the match. If they do, the employment
relation may be terminated by shocks modelled as a Poisson process with ex-
ogenous rate ￿. If they do not, agents go back to the previous state and search
continues.
With a constant and common intertemporal discount rate ￿, the stationarity
of the environment generates the following value for an individual deciding not





for  = 
Once an agent decides to participate, the value of participating in the labor
market is the value of the unemployment state since search while unemployed
is a necessary step to meet employers and receive o⁄ers. In each instant while
unemployed, the worker may receive no o⁄er or an o⁄er from a prejudiced or
unprejudiced employer. The proportion of prejudiced employers is denoted by
.3 The unemployment state generates a ￿ ow value  which describes the ￿ ow
of utility or disutility from the search process. Therefore, by stationarity and
by property of the Poisson processes, the value of being unemployed for each
1Capital letters function of a random variable denote the cumulative distribution function,
i.e. (). Moreover, given a cdf () I will de￿ne  () ￿ 1 ¬ ()
2Bowlus 1997 develops and estimates a search model that allows for a full dynamic treat-
ment of the non-participation state to study gender di⁄erentials in the labor market.
3A more precise de￿nition of  would be as the measure of o⁄er that the worker is receiving
coming from prejudiced employers, with a single employer contributing in a higher or smaller
proportion to this measure. However, employers are highly stylized here and the di⁄erence
becomes simply semantic. To simplify exposition, I will then refer to  simply as the proportion
of prejudiced employers.
6type of worker is:
￿U =  + ￿f
Z
max[ [ ()] ¬ 0]()+ (2)
+(1 ¬ )
Z
max[ [ ()] ¬ 0]()g
for  =  The expression is written in recursive form: the max operator
indicates that workers accept the match if and only if the value of ￿lling that job
is higher than the outside option, i.e. unemployment. Notice that the value of
unemployment is constant with respect to both wages and productivity because
all the agents, conditioning on gender, are ex-ante identical: only when a match
is realized the ex-post individual heterogeneity will be generated.
A worker of type  ￿lling a job at an employer of type  and receiving a
wage  is characterized by:
 [ ()] =
 () + ￿
￿ + ￿
(3)
for  =  and  = 
The last element necessary to fully characterize the decision rule and the
equilibrium is the wage setting process. The axiomatic Nash-bargaining solu-
tion is assumed to solve the bargaining game. The wage schedule is therefore
obtained by maximizing with respect to  the product of the surpluses for
the worker and the employer (the Nash bargaining product):










+ (1 ¬ ￿)￿U (5)
for  =  and  = , where ￿ 2 [01] denotes the workers￿weight in
the Nash bargaining product and Ifg denotes an indicator function equal to
one when the worker is female and the employer prejudiced. As a result the
wage of the worker is a linear combination of the worker￿ s outside option in the
bargaining process (the discounted value of unemployment ￿U) and the total
yield generated in the match ( or ( ¬ ) in the case of a women matching
with a prejudiced employer). Notice that the productivity  is reduced by the
discrimination intensity parameter  when a prejudiced employer is matching
with a woman because this is a utility cost that the employer is bearing in that
particular type of match.
2.2 The Equilibrium
The main implications of the previous section are that wages are increasing in
productivity (equation (5)), that the value of being employed is increasing in
wages (equation (3)) while the value of unemployment is constant with respect
to both productivity and wages (equation (2)). Hence the optimal decision rule
7is characterized by a reservation value property de￿ned over productivity. That
is, the optimal decision rule to accept a match has the following form: accept the
match if the productivity draw is higher than the reservation value ￿
 and reject
otherwise. The reservation value is common to both the worker of type  and
the employer of type : this is an agreement result that derives directly from the
assumed axiomatic Nash solution for the bargaining problem.4 The reservation
value is de￿ned as the productivity value that makes agents indi⁄erent between
accepting or rejecting the match. Imposing this condition on equations (3) and
(5) leads to:
￿
 = ￿U + Ifg (6)
￿
 = ￿U (7)
for  =  and  =  and where ￿
 de￿nes the reservation wage. No-
tice that the reservation productivity value depends on both the worker￿ s and
employer￿ s type, while the reservation wage depends only on the worker￿ s type.
The intuition is that employers have di⁄erent preferences over workers￿types
while workers base their decisions only on wage considerations.
The optimal decision rule to participate in the labor market also has a reser-
vation value property: an individual will enter the labor market when the value
of nonparticipation is lower than the value of participation. As pointed out
before, the value of participating in the labor market is the value of the unem-
ployment state. The reservation value ￿
 is then obtained by equation (1):
￿
 = ￿U (8)
for  = .
The unique steady state equilibrium will: (i) uniquely de￿ne the values of
unemployment as a function of the exogenous parameters; (ii) equalize ￿ ows
in and out of unemployment; and (iii) determine the measure of labor market
participants. This is stated in the following de￿nition.
De￿nition 1 Given a vector (￿;￿￿;￿) and the probability distribution
functions () and () an equilibrium is two vectors ()=
such that:














￿ + ￿[(1 ¬ )e (￿U) + e (￿U + Ifg)]
o¬1
(10)
 = (￿U) (11)
for  = 
4Formally, it results from the ￿rst order condition of the maximization involving equation
4.
8The main implication of the equilibrium in terms of prejudice and gender
di⁄erentials is that the value of unemployment is lower for women than for men,
that is   .5 This is a direct consequence of the presence of prejudiced
employers. Even if men and women are ex-ante identical (same distribution of
productivity and nonparticipation values; same arrival and termination rates;
same discount rate and Nash-bargaining coe¢ cient), women are disadvantaged
because with positive probability they can meet prejudiced employers that will
pay them a lower wage at same productivity and will hire them with a lower
probability.
This equilibrium e⁄ect alone can broadly explain the empirical evidence pre-
sented in the Introduction, that is a negative wage di⁄erential for women and
a lower female participation rate. The negative wage di⁄erential is driven by
two components, easy to identify by looking at equation (5). First, women
working for prejudiced employers receive lower wages than men with the same
productivity because of the disutility component . Second, both women work-
ing for prejudiced and unprejudiced employers receive lower wages than men
because of the lower outside option (￿U  ￿U). This second "spillover"
e⁄ect (Flabbi 2005) implies that wage discrimination is present also at unpreju-
diced employers. It is an equilibrium e⁄ect that derives from the endogenously
weaker bargaining position of women at any type of employers.
Implications for the unemployment rate di⁄erential are ambiguous since the
female unemployment rates can be both higher, lower or equal to male unem-
ployment rates depending on the intensity of prejudice.
These results establish the ability of the model to broadly match the evi-
dence. The task of the identi￿cation strategy will be to show that the separate
identi￿cation of the di⁄erent components of the model is possible even when
worker heterogeneity is introduced; in particular when we allow for di⁄erent
productivity distributions between men and women.
3 Empirical Speci￿cation and Identi￿cation
The minimum data requirements necessary to identify the fundamental parame-
ters of the model are fairly standard: accepted wages for individuals currently
employed (), on-going unemployment durations for individuals currently un-
employed () knowledge of gender and employment status for each individual.6
As it will be clear in the identi￿cation discussion, some parametric assumptions
are necessary. The productivity distribution () is assumed to be a location-
scale distribution, with location parameter denoted by ￿ and scale parameter
denoted by ￿ while the nonparticipation value distribution () is assumed to
5The proof is obtained by totally di⁄erentiating the implict function ￿U () with respect
to  and .
6No employers￿side information is necessary if symmetric Nash bargaining is assumed.
9be an invertible one parameter distribution, with parameter denoted by   :
() = (;￿;￿) (12)
() = (;  ) (13)
The likelihood accounts for three di⁄erent contributions: one for unemployed
individuals de￿ned over the density of unemployment duration; one for employed
individuals de￿ned over the density of accepted wages; and one for individuals
that are not participating in the labor market. For each of these labor market
states, individuals contribute di⁄erently depending on their gender and the year
in which they are observed. As it will be clari￿ed in the empirical section, each
year represents a potentially di⁄erent steady state. To simplify the notation, the
identi￿cation discussion will not include all this heterogeneity, which is however
fully exploited in the estimation. In this respect, it is useful to introduce the
following de￿nitions.
De￿nition 2 Given a labor market environment characterized by the parame-
ters
  0 ￿ f￿;￿￿￿;￿;￿  g
the following cases are de￿ned:
Homogenous case: no employers￿types and no workers￿types
  1 ￿ f￿;￿￿￿;￿;￿  g
Heterogenous case: employers￿ types de￿ned by prejudice and workers￿
types de￿ned by gender
  2 ￿ f￿;￿￿￿;￿;￿  g
Completely Heterogenous case: types de￿ned by prejudice and gender;
heterogeneity in other labor market parameters over types
  3 ￿ f￿￿￿￿;￿￿  g=
Completely Heterogenous case with Over-Time Heterogeneity: types
de￿ned by prejudice and gender; heterogeneity in other labor market parameters
over types and over time
  4 ￿ f￿￿￿￿;￿￿  g=;=1
These de￿nitions are useful to understand which parameters are allowed
to vary and in which context. For example, the discount rate is common to
all agents in the economy and it is always assumed constant; the arrival rate
instead can be assumed to be di⁄erent for men and women, and to vary over
time. The Heterogenous case has been used to illustrate the theoretical model
in the previous section, while a Completely Heterogenous case with Over-Time
Heterogeneity is the speci￿cation that will be used in estimation.
103.1 Likelihood Function
To specify the likelihood and discuss the identi￿cation strategy I will use the
Homogenous case: it greatly simpli￿es the notation while allowing for a suf-
￿ciently detailed treatment. Each individual in the population is denoted by
 and belongs to either one of three possible states: nonparticipation (),
unemployment () and employment ().
The ￿rst contribution concerns non-labor market participants f 2 g and,
as implied by the optimal decision rule, is equal to:
 ( 2 ) = e (￿U) (14)
The second contribution concerns labor market participants currently un-
employed f 2   2 g. Their contribution is a density de￿ned over unem-
ployment durations. By the stationarity of the environment, the hazard rate
out of unemployment is constant:
 = ￿e (￿U) (15)
implying a negative exponential density for on-going unemployment durations:




The last two terms in equation (16) are introduced to take into account that
we observe unemployment duration only for individuals that participate in the
labor market and are currently unemployed.
Finally, the third contribution concerns employed individuals f 2   2 g
and it is de￿ned over accepted wages. The density is obtained by exploiting the
equilibrium mapping between match-speci￿c productivity and wages:
(  ￿









The joint likelihood combines this information leading to:
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ln ( 2 )























where  denotes the numerosity of the corresponding set. A similar
procedure can be used to extend the derivation of the likelihood for more het-
erogenous cases.
113.2 Identi￿cation
Conditioning on participation, the identi￿cation of the homogenous case is based
on Flinn and Heckman 1982, the identi￿cation of the heterogenous and com-
pletely heterogenous cases is developed in Flabbi 2005.
Starting with the homogenous case, the parameters of the model are   1 ￿
f￿;￿￿￿;￿;￿  g. First notice that the symmetric bargaining assumption
implies ￿ = 05. This assumption is consistent with the common discount rate
shared by workers and employers but it is admittedly motivated by the di¢ culty
of identifying this coe¢ cient using only labor market supply information.7 The
second observation is that  and ￿ enter the likelihood (18) only through the
reservation value ￿U. This fact implies the two parameters can only be jointly
identi￿ed but has the advantage of generating a useful reparametrization: di-
rectly identify ￿U in place of (￿). Also notice that ￿ enters the likelihood only
through . As a ￿rst step, then, consider the identi￿cation of the parameters
f￿￿U￿;￿  g
The reservation value may be identi￿ed and non-parametrically estimated
by the minimum observed wage:
c ￿U = min
2
fg (19)
This estimator is strongly consistent8 allowing for the estimation of the other
parameters on the concentrated likelihood using c ￿U in place of ￿U.
The hazard rate and the termination rate are identi￿ed by unemployment
















The nonparticipation distribution parameter is identi￿ed and easily esti-
mated if (;  ) is invertible with respect to   . In this application, I will
assume a negative exponential distribution:
(;  ) = 1 ¬ exp(¬  )    0 (22)
leading to the following maximum likelihood estimator:




The estimator is also equivalent to the sample analog estimator implied by
(14). Notice that under the current parametrization the only link between the
7Eckstein and Wolpin 1995 and Flinn 2005 discuss the issue in the context of a similar
search-matching-bargaining model.
8Flinn and Heckman 1982 prove strong consistency of the estimator.
12participation decision parameter   and the other structural parameters is the
reservation value c ￿U. This implies that with respect to a model without a
participation decision, such as Flabbi 2005 or Flinn 2006, there are no gains
in terms of the identi￿cation of the other structural parameters by introducing
the participation decision information. In practice, one piece of information
is added, the participation rate, and one additional parameter is identi￿ed,
  . Still, the presence of the nonparticipation state generates gains in terms of
the equilibrium e⁄ects that can be taken into account while performing policy
experiments, e⁄ects that are particularly relevant when comparing over time.
Two additional parameters are left to be identi￿ed: ￿ and ￿. Flinn and
Heckman 1982 shows that no additional progress can be done in this direction
without assuming a recoverable distribution for (;￿;￿): recoverability guar-
antees that the location and scale parameters of the distribution are identi￿ed








],   0 (24)
where ￿ and ￿ denote the standard normal pdf and cdf. The lognormal dis-
tribution is recoverable and constitutes the most common assumption in the
literature, since the empirical distribution of wages does actually resemble a
truncated lognormal. Given the distributional assumption, it is possible to


















￿0 = ￿￿ + (1 ¬ ￿)￿U (26)
￿0 = ￿￿ (27)
where ￿0 and ￿0 are the location and scale parameters of the lognormal wage
o⁄ers distribution. However, the only observed distribution is the accepted wage





and recoverability, ￿0 and ￿0 are identi￿ed. With
the additional knowledge of ￿, it is then possible to identify ￿ and ￿ by solving
the two linear equations (26) and (27).
At this stage, it is also possible to separately identify the two components
of the hazard rate: the arrival rate and the probability to accept the match.
This is relevant because it allows for the identi￿cation of the parameter ￿ that
constitutes the real primitive parameter of the model in place of the reduced
form parameter  By equation (15), the arrival rate is identi￿ed by:
b ￿ =
b 
e (c ￿U;b ￿;b ￿)
(28)
13This step concludes the identi￿cation of the parameters f￿;￿￿U￿￿  g
under the homogenous case.
The heterogenous case implies the identi￿cation of two additional parame-
ters  and  Flabbi 2005 provides the proof and a detailed discussion. The main
result from this analysis is that beside the recoverability condition de￿ned by
Flinn and Heckman 1982, two additional requirements must be imposed on the
match-speci￿c productivity distribution: it should be characterized by a location
and a scale parameters and should allow for identi￿cation of its ￿nite mixture.
These restrictions rule out some fairly common distributions, as the Pareto and
the Exponential, but still allow for identi￿cation using the more frequently used
Lognormal and the quite popular Normal and Gamma distributions. These re-
strictions derive from the following identi￿cation strategy, formally proved in
the Appendix of Flabbi 2005. The observed earnings distribution of women is
a mixture of accepted jobs at prejudiced and unprejudiced employers. The pro-
portion in which the two distributions are combined in this mixture is exactly
the proportion of prejudiced employers . Under the assumption of (;￿;￿)
being characterized by a location and scale parameters, the two distributions
composing the mixture have di⁄erent location parameters but share the same
scale parameters. If (;￿;￿) allows for the identi￿cation of its ￿nite mix-
tures, we can then directly identify four pieces of information: the proportion
of the two distributions in the mixture, the common scale parameter, and the
two di⁄erent location parameters. From the scale parameter and one of the two
location parameters we can identify (￿;￿) with the same procedure described
equations (25)-(27). As mentioned, the proportion in the mixture directly iden-
ti￿es . Finally, thanks to the linearity of the mapping between match-speci￿c
productivities and the accepted wages, equation (5), the di⁄erence between the
two location parameters is exactly equal to the discrimination intensity , thus
guaranteeing its identi￿cation.
The identi￿cation of the completely heterogenous case with over-time hetero-
geneity, which is the speci￿cation actually estimated in the paper, is obtained
by repeating the previous identi￿cation strategy on each year and by assuming
that each year is the realization of a (potentially di⁄erent) steady state.
4 Data
The minimum data requirements necessary to identify and estimate the model
are earnings, unemployment durations, employment status and gender of indi-
viduals over a su¢ ciently long period of time. Data from the Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASES or March supplement) of the Current Population
Survey (CPS) contains this information, providing a representative sample of
the U.S. labor market. The construction of the estimation sample should also
address two additional issues: the ex-ante homogeneity conditioning on gender
assumed by the model and the steady state equilibrium assumption necessary
to specify the likelihood function.
The homogeneity issue is addressed by extracting a sample homogenous with
14respect to observable characteristics.9 In particular, the estimation sample is
constituted by individuals who are white, 30 to 55 years old, with a College
degree or more, and that are not self-employed. Some speci￿cations will also
control for out of labor market characteristics, such as marital status and pres-
ence of young children.
The steady state assumption issue is addressed by appropriately selecting the
years on which the estimation is implemented. The ASES survey is available
from 1979 to 2005. However, 1979 and 1980 have an unusually high percentage of
top-coded values on earnings variables. Moreover, the proportion of top-coding
is very di⁄erent by gender and signi￿cantly a⁄ects the shape of the accepted
earnings distribution. I therefore limited the sample to 1981-2005. Out of this
sample I have selected three years - 1985, 1995 and 2005 - because they satisfy
the following criteria: (i) they are equally spaced over-time and enough far away
to describe di⁄erent steady-states; (ii) they are not boom or recession years and
therefore they seem more appropriate to describe a steady state; (iii) 1985 is
in the middle of the convergence period, 1995 is in the middle of the slowdown
and 2005 is the last year available.
Descriptive statistics on the estimation sample are reported in Table 1 after
some trimming is performed on the raw data.10 The ￿rst three rows report mean
and standard deviation of hourly earnings for the overall sample of employed
individuals, for employed women and for employed men. Hourly earnings are
obtained either by using the value directly reported in the CPS survey or by
computing the value dividing weekly earnings by the usual hours worked per
week.11 Earnings are de￿ ated using the Consumer Price Index12 and they are
expressed in 2005 US dollars. The data show a di⁄erential with a trend similar
to the evidence presented in the Introduction: a decrease from 1985 to 1995 and
then some variability from 1995 to 2005. The di⁄erential is always higher than
20%.
The second group of variables reported in Table 1 are unemployment du-
9It is an assumption fairly common in the literature, see for example Flinn 2005 and Bowlus
and Eckstein 2002.
10Validation data and the observation of extremely low hourly earnings suggest measurement
errors asymmetric by gender in the low tail (Bollinger 1998). The solution used in this paper
is to trim the bottom 5% of the sample (Bowlus 1997). Changing of the bottom trimming
point has a direct impact on the reservation wages but the other parameters are reasonably
stable, as already found in Flabbi 2005. The di⁄erence here is that the range over which the
estimates are stable is smaller (1% to 5% as compared to 1% to 10% in Flabbi 2005) due
to sensitivity of the estimates for the year with the lower numerosity (1985). Top-coding on
income and earnings variables is also present in the CPS data. I have run the estimates both
including and excluding top-coded values and the main results do not change. The estimation
sample presented in the paper includes top-coded values.
11There is a relative high proportion of missing values in the usual hours worked variable.
To reduce the impact of this problem, for those individuals that are not paid by the hour,
do not report hourly earnings, and have missing value on the usual hours worked variable I
compute hourly earnings by dividing weekly earnings by 45 if they work full-time and by 25
if they work part-time. Hourly earnings obtained in this way are less than 2% of the sample.
I have also estimated the model excluding individuals with imputed hours obtaining very
similar estimates to those reported in Table 2.
12Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers; Series Id: CUUR0000SA0.
15rations. They are measured in months and they are obtained by rescaling the
original weekly unemployment durations. As found in other works, unemploy-
ment durations are lower for women, even if the di⁄erential is shrinking over
the twenty years period under consideration. Finally, the bottom of Table 1
reports unemployment rates and participation rates.13 Interestingly unemploy-
ment rate ranking reverses: from an higher unemployment rate for women in
1985 and 1995 to a lower unemployment rate in 2005. Participation rates are
always lower for women by at least ten percentage points. It is worth noticing
that this "homogenous" group of individuals has generally a lower unemploy-
ment rate and a higher participation rate than the population not selected with
respect to the homogeneity controls. The participation rate di⁄erential is also
lower than the one computed on more aggregate samples, as for example the
one reported in Figure 2.
5 Results
Maximum Likelihood estimates are implemented on the sample obtained by
pooling the three years together. Beyond some e¢ ciency gains, the joint esti-
mation allows for the introduction of restrictions across years to test di⁄erent
speci￿cations or for the isolation of speci￿c equilibrium e⁄ects. The preferred
speci￿cation - reported in Table 2 - estimates a reparametrization of the orig-
inal model where in place of directly estimating the disutility , the following
parameter  is estimated:
 ￿







It de￿nes the relative disutility of hiring a woman, that is the ratio between the
absolute value of the discrimination intensity and an indicator of the average
productivity in the economy. Since disutility is measured on the same scale of
productivity and since productivity is changing over time, it is more instructive
to use such relative measure instead of the absolute value . The interpretation is
that  represents the proportion of an average match-speci￿c productivity that
a prejudice employer is willing to sacri￿ce to hire a men instead of a women
generating the same .
The reparameterization is also useful as a scale normalization for compu-
tational purposes and as a meaningful way to impose parameters restrictions
across years. In particular, I will restrict this ratio to be the same for all the
three years. Notice that this does not mean to impose the same disutility but
that the ratio between the disutility and a synthetic measure of productivity in
a given year should be the same. The behavioral assumption is that preferences
13The labor market status (employment, unemployment and nonparticipation) is obtained
by a set of questions organized by the CPS team in the monthly labor force recode variable
which directly assings each individual in the sample to employment, unemployment or not-
in-the labor force status. Excluded from the universe are kids and individuals in the armed
forces.
16are very slow to adjust and therefore the average relative disutility represented
by the parameter  is not very likely to change over time. A Likelihood Ratio
(LR) test performed on the joint sample does not reject this restriction and
it is reported at the bottom of Table 2.14 This restriction also helps obtain-
ing a more precise estimate of the disutility parameter for 2005 and makes the
comparison across time easier: by estimating a common relative disutility the
proportion of prejudiced employers becomes the parameter that describes the
evolution of prejudice. This is also the parameter that should be a⁄ected by
over-time changes in the original Becker￿ s model.
5.1 Estimation results
Estimation results are presented in Table 2: the speci￿cation is - using the
terminology introduced in Section 3 - a completely heterogenous case with over-
time heterogeneity. Estimates are precise and the restriction on  is not rejected
(P-value: 0.799). The main result is that the proportion of prejudiced employers
is decreasing over time: the proportion decreases at a faster rate in the last
decade than in the previous decade, moving from 69.2% in 1985, to about 57.1%
in 1995, to about 32.2% in 2005.15 The relative disutility is estimated to be
about 32%, a value comparable with estimates obtained by Bowlus and Eckstein
2002 on a sample of black and white workers from NLSY, and by Flabbi 2005
on CPS data for 1995 on men and women.
Arrival rates are estimated to be always higher for women while termination
rates are higher for women in 1985 and 1995 but not in 2005. These results
are similar to Bowlus 1997 that estimates higher arrival and termination rates
for women on a sample extracted from NLSY 1979-1991. Hazard rates out of
unemployment are not exogenous because they are the product of the exogenous
arrival rate and the endogenous probability to accept the match. The estimates
imply higher hazard rates for women but a strong convergence over time: the
positive di⁄erential for women decreases from 95.8% in 1985, to 68.5% in 1995,
to 16.1% in 2005. The participation coe¢ cient   implies an average value of
nonparticipation higher for women in all years: $ 4.7 per hour for women and $
2.8 dollars per hour for men in 1985, to 5.1 dollars for women and 3.2 for men
in 2005.
Productivity trends are better evaluated by looking at predicted values
rather than at the primitive ￿ and ￿. The ￿rst two rows in Table 3 report
the predicted average productivity for the two groups. Men￿ s productivity is
steadily increasing while women￿ s productivity is increasing from 1985 to 1995
and decreasing from 1995 to 2005. This last result is surprising and may be due
to the limited controls for sample selection in the model. However, participa-
14Other speci￿cation tests have been performed: in particular a "full prejudice" model that
imposes a proportion of prejudiced employers equal to one for all years is rejected with respect
to a speci￿cation without restrictions (P-value = 0047).
15The result of a decreasing proportion in  is robust to the removal of the cross-restriction
on . However, di⁄erences are generally not signi￿cant: for example, the restriction 85 =
95 = 05 is not rejected at conventional signi￿cance levels (P-value=0.398).
17tion rates for this homogeneous group of individuals do not change much over
the period and they actually decrease both for men and women from 1995 to
2005. Hence, to rationalize the results, a sample selection story should propose
a mapping from out-of-labor market characteristics to labor market productiv-
ity that could potentially change over time.16 To partially address the issue, I
have performed estimates on samples homogenous with respect to observables
usually correlated with sample selection. Results are reported in Table 4 and
will be discussed below.17
The second group of variables presented in Table 3 concerns average o⁄ered
and accepted earnings by gender. The gender di⁄erential in average accepted
earnings within this relatively homogenous group of workers is comparable with
the conditional di⁄erential presented in the Introduction and it is conceptually
similar to results obtained in the wage regressions literature. In addition, the
model allows for an estimation of the di⁄erential in o⁄ered earnings: this is in
many respect a more relevant variable to compare groups or returns, as pointed
out among others by Eckstein and Wolpin 1995. O⁄ered earnings are closer to
be a primitive of the model18 since accepted earnings are an endogenous equilib-
rium outcome resulting from the optimal decision rule. Since these equilibrium
e⁄ects are stronger for women, the estimates suggest that simply looking at ac-
cepted wages conditioning on an homogenous sample may underestimate wage
discrimination. In other words, women are receiving o⁄ers that are worse, with
respect to men, than the ones that are accepted but they are able to partially
overcome these worse o⁄ers by reacting optimally. In 2005, for example, we
observe a negative wage di⁄erential of 23.1% but the underlying di⁄erential in
wage o⁄ers was higher and equal to 26.5%.
Table 3 is also useful to evaluate the ￿t of the model by comparing pre-
dicted moments with the sample moments reported in Table 1. The ￿t on ￿rst
moments is always very good for female accepted earnings while average male
earnings are slightly overestimated in 1995 (28.24$/h instead of a sample value
of 27.89$/h). Unemployment rates are interesting because they are an overi-
dentifying restrictions implied by the equilibrium of the model and therefore
matching them is a test for the model. The bottom of Table 3 shows a perfect
￿t implying that the model is not rejected on this ground.
Table 4 presents selected parameters estimates from the same speci￿cation
16Blau and Kahn 2004 presents some evidence that women moved from being positively
selected in the labor market in the 1980s (i.e. more productive women were the ones actually
supplying labor) to being slightly negatively selected in the 1990s.
17Another potentially relevant selectivity issue over time concerns selection into education:
if the proportion or the composition of individuals holding a college degree changes over time,
we are e⁄ectively estimating on di⁄erent groups, thus a⁄ecting the comparison across years.
To address the issue I have computed the proportion of individuals holding a college degree by
cohorts and estimated the model over di⁄erent cohorts. The results are that the proportion
of individuals with College degree increases signi￿cantly from 1985 to 1995 but not from 1995
and 2005 and that if the point estimates change slightly, the main results are con￿rmed.
18The primitive in the model is the productivity distribution while also o⁄ered wages are
endogenous because they are the outcome of the bargaining process. However, the o⁄ered wage
distribution is computed before the optimal decisons on accepting or rejecting the match and
in this sense is closer to be a primitive of the model than the accepted wages distribution.
18reported in Table 2 but on di⁄erent samples. The estimation samples are se-
lected to be homogenous with respect to some out-of-labor market variables
that may have gender-speci￿c impacts. To present results in a succinct way,
Table 4 does not report all the estimated structural parameters but only the
prejudice parameters () and an indicator of productivity di⁄erentials: the
ratio of average female/male ex-ante productivity. The ￿rst set of results is
obtained by imposing no controls and simply reports the estimates from Table
2. The second set of results refers to a sample of individuals married at least
once at the time of the interview. The third to a sample of individuals living
with a family member under age 18 and the fourth imposes both requirements.
Results con￿rm the general pattern of a decreasing proportion of prejudiced
employers over time. However, when considering only individuals with young
family members, there is no appreciable di⁄erence between the proportion of
prejudiced employers in 1995 and 2005. The general trend found in Table 2 in
terms of productivity di⁄erentials is also con￿rmed: productivity di⁄erentials
increase between 1995 and 2005. Finally, the comparison of results for a given
year shows quite robust point estimates for 2005, a larger variation in 1995 and
an intermediate value for 1985.
5.2 Counterfactual experiments
Di⁄erent explanations have been proposed to account for the slowdown in the
convergence of gender di⁄erentials in the 1990s.19 One contribution of this paper
is to evaluate whether changes in prejudice over time may have played a role. To
better assess this impact it is interesting to perform counterfactual experiments
that isolate the impact of prejudice on labor market variables. The proposed
experiments set all the structural parameters for each group to the estimated
male values for 2005 while changing the parameters that describe prejudice: the
proportion of prejudiced employers  and the intensity of discrimination relative
to productivity . For each of these environments, a new equilibrium is com-
puted and the corresponding labor market variables for each gender are obtained
allowing for an evaluation of the impact of prejudice once equilibrium e⁄ects are
taken into account. The speci￿cation used in the experiments corresponds to
the heterogenous case de￿ned in Section 3.
Table 5 reports the results of the ￿rst experiment: the proportion of prej-
udiced employers is set at the estimated values for 1985, 1995 and 2005 and
then is set at two additional and arbitrary low values in columns 4 and 5. The
bottom part of the table reports the gender di⁄erentials generated in these
counterfactual environments on statistics of the relevant labor market variables.
For example, the second row in the ￿rst column reports that women would
experience a negative di⁄erential of 27.5% in average o⁄ered earnings in an en-
vironment where they are ex-ante equal to men and about 69% of the employers
are prejudiced. The following rows report di⁄erentials computed on accepted
earnings, unemployment durations, unemployment and participation rates. The
19For example Fortin and Lemieux 2000 relates this trend to changes in male wage inequality.
19last row reports the di⁄erential on the value of unemployment : this may be
considered a welfare measure since it is the value to the worker of participating
in the speci￿c labor market under consideration.20
Results con￿rm the expected convergence between men and women as the
proportion of prejudiced employers decreases; the convergence is achieved on all
the labor market variables. Looking at the value of unemployment as a welfare
measure to summarize them all, the di⁄erential would move from more than
50% in 1985 to about half of this value in 2005 to about 3% in the hypothetical
 = 5% environment. Additionally, what is interesting in this exercise is the
speed of the convergence as  decreases, once the equilibrium e⁄ects are taken
into account. These equilibrium e⁄ects are important because they have the
potential to magnify the impact of a reduction in . For example a decrease in
 a⁄ects the accepted earnings di⁄erentials by the direct impact on the wage
schedule o⁄ered by the prejudiced employers, by the equilibrium impact on
the reservation wage and by the equilibrium impact on the outside option in
bargaining with any type of employer including the unprejudiced. The result
is that the impact on labor market outcomes can be highly non-linear as the
proportion of prejudiced employers decreases. As a result we observe that for
high values of , as in 1985 and in 1995, female workers are able to partially
reduce the impact of prejudice: the accepted earnings di⁄erential - about 22%
in 1985 and 17% in 1995 - is much smaller than the o⁄ered earnings di⁄erential
- about 27% in 1985 and 23% in 1995. These relatively high proportions of
prejudiced employers are also the only ones able to generate earnings di⁄erentials
comparable to the ones observed in the data. For a proportion of prejudiced
employers of about 30%, as in 2005, the observed earnings di⁄erential would
be comparable to the lowest in the world, such as values typically experienced
by Scandinavian countries. For a proportion of less than 5%, convergence in
labor market variables is basically achieved. This implies that, at the current
rate of reduction in  it will require slightly more than ten years to achieve full
convergence. However, nothing guarantees that this rate will remain constant:
for example at the rate of the previous decade, from 1985 to 1995, it will require
more than twenty years to achieve convergence.
Table 6 reports the results of the second experiment: as before all the struc-
tural parameters are ￿xed at the 2005 male values but now also the proportion of
prejudiced employers is ￿xed at the estimated 2005 value while it is the relative
discrimination intensity that is changing. Since only one value of  is estimated
for the three time periods, it is necessary to generate a meaningful variation of
. The change is obtained as follows. A summary measure of the amount of
prejudice in the economy is the average discrimination intensity which, under
the model parametrization is simply:
 () =  ￿ 
The year-speci￿c 0 are then obtained as those values that generate the es-
timated average discrimination intensity once all the parameters excluding 
20See Flinn 2002 for a discussion on welfare measures in a search environment.
20(but including ) are ￿xed at the 2005 value.21 The logic of the experiment
is as follow: given the same average discrimination intensity, does it matter
that this amount is generated by many prejudiced employers with low intensity
or by few prejudiced employers with high intensity? The ￿rst row of Table 6
reports the estimated average discrimination intensity and the second row the
counterfactual 0 As before, new equilibria are generated using these 0 and
for each equilibrium the distribution on the relevant labor market variables are
obtained. The bottom panel reports the implied di⁄erentials on these labor
market variables and on the welfare measure .
As expected, we observe convergence between men and women as time
passes. Comparing Table 5 and 6 we obtain an interesting result: the reduction
in discrimination intensity improves women￿ s condition more than the reduction
in  (at given  ()). For example, in 1995 the welfare/value of unemployment
di⁄erential is 43.5% after the reduction in  from 1985 but 35.9% after the reduc-
tion in . By looking at labor market variables, we see that this is a result of the
optimal acceptance rule: the di⁄erential on the accepted wages is signi￿cantly
lower in Table 6 than it is in Table 5. Also the other labor market variables
register a relatively better outcome for women but it is on the accepted wages
that most of the action is taking place. These results are also comforting in
terms of the separate identi￿cation of  and  because they emphasize that the
proportion of prejudiced employers and the intensity of discrimination, albeit
having a degree of substitutability, have di⁄erent impacts on observed labor
market outcomes.
6 Conclusion
This paper was set to address two issues: ￿rst, to assess whether changes in
prejudice over time could explain the slowdown in the convergence of earnings
between men and women in the 1990s22; second, to assess the validity of Becker￿ s
model of taste discrimination in explaining groups di⁄erentials by providing an
estimate for the proportion of prejudiced employers over time .
The paper estimates that the proportion of prejudiced employers has been
decreasing in the last twenty years. This reduction has happened at an increas-
ing rate both in absolute and relative terms: the proportion has gone from 69%
in 1985, to 57% in 1995, to 32% in 2005. The estimates are obtained by devel-
oping a search model with matching and bargaining and by allowing men and
women to di⁄er in terms of behavior (participation rate, arrival rate of job o⁄ers,
termination rate of the employment relation) and match-speci￿c productivity.
With respect to the ￿rst objective, the estimation of a decreasing propor-
tion of prejudiced employers implies that employers￿prejudice does not explain
21Therefore, by construction, the third column of Table 6 should be equal to the third
column of Table 5 because they have the same underlining parameters even if one is obtained
by keeping  ￿xed and moving  and the other by keeping  ￿xed and moving .
22See for example Blau and Kahn 2004, Fortin and Lemieux 2000 and Eckstein and Nagypal
2004.
21the slowdown. Moreover the decrease is faster over the 1995-2005 period than
over the 1985-1995 period reinforcing the argument that a change in prejudiced
behavior cannot be responsible for the slowdown in the converge of the labor
market position of men and women. Estimation results attribute most of the
slowdown to the faster increase in average male productivity with respect to
female productivity: the ratio of average female productivity over average male
productivity has decreased from about 95% in 1995 to about 82% in 2005. One
possible explanation for this increase in productivity di⁄erentials is the change in
the sample selection of women participating in the labor market. Blau and Kahn
2004, for example, tentatively suggests that women may have moved from be-
ing positively selected in the labor market to be negatively selected in the labor
market. However, if such a process is taking place, it is really endogenous with
respect to the labor market environment, including its proportion of prejudiced
employers. A better understanding of the issue therefore requires a complete
general equilibrium treatment of some of the channels developed and estimated
in this paper.
With respect to the second objective, the estimated decreasing trend in the
proportion of prejudiced employers is broadly consistent with the predictions
of the Becker￿ s taste discrimination model. However, the implied adjustment
process is estimated to be very slow, covering at least three decades and con-
tradicting formulations of the model developed in perfectly competitive labor
markets.
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23Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Estimation Sample
1985 1995 2005
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
j 2  24.257 10.253 25.286 11.756 27.831 14.236
j 2  2  20.090 9.413 22.133 10.452 24.378 12.380
j 2  2  27.202 9.794 27.891 12.134 31.342 15.119
Di⁄erential (%) -26.14 -20.64 -22.22
j 2  4.846 6.448 5.394 5.735 4.846 5.539
j 2  2  3.209 3.798 4.220 4.759 4.432 5.175
j 2  2  6.279 7.900 7.106 6.656 5.146 5.825
Di⁄erential (%) -48.90 -40.61 -13.87
 0.023 0.026 0.030
 0.026 0.034 0.025
 0.021 0.019 0.034
Di⁄erential (%) 23.18 73.99 -28.13
 0.902 0.913 0.884
 0.804 0.852 0.813
 0.977 0.968 0.961
Di⁄erential (%) -17.71 -11.98 -15.40
 +  1919 2283 2741
Note: De￿nitions:  =hourly earnings in 2005 dollars,  =unemployment dura-
tion in months,  =unemployment rate,  =participation rate. The participation rate
is computed before trimming the sample.
24Table 2: Maximum Likelihood Estimates
1985 1995 2005
￿ 0.1598 0.1413 0.1962
( 0.0326 ) ( 0.0288 ) ( 0.0422 )
￿ 0.3291 0.2467 0.2446
( 0.0721 ) ( 0.0418 ) ( 0.0422 )
￿ 0.0035 0.0028 0.0069
( 0.0010 ) ( 0.0008 ) ( 0.0014 )
￿ 0.0084 0.0082 0.0057
( 0.0026 ) ( 0.0020 ) ( 0.0014 )
￿ 3.6701 3.6966 3.7757
( 0.0149 ) ( 0.0166 ) ( 0.0176 )
￿ 0.4880 0.5685 0.6151
( 0.0111 ) ( 0.0124 ) ( 0.0135 )
￿ 3.6425 3.7217 3.6282
( 0.0884 ) ( 0.0622 ) ( 0.0428 )
￿ 0.3858 0.4175 0.5286
( 0.0305 ) ( 0.0263 ) ( 0.0235 )
 0.6917 0.5714 0.3224
( 0.1902 ) ( 0.1498 ) ( 0.1021 )
 0.3254
( 0.0414 )
￿U 10.4765 8.9373 10.2587
￿U 7.6121 6.8224 8.5550
   0.3601 0.3851 0.3162
   0.2141 0.2800 0.1960
 -26523.13
LR Test (P-value):
85 = 95 = 05 0.799
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Joint estimation on all years.
25Table 3: Predicted Values
1985 1995 2005
 (j 2 ) 44.22 47.38 52.71
 (j 2 ) 41.14 45.10 43.29
 (j 2 ) 27.35 28.16 31.49
 (j 2  2 ) 27.41 28.24 31.69
 (j 2 ) 19.40 21.56 23.16
 (j 2  2 ) 20.04 22.11 24.37
 (j 2  2 ) 6.280 7.108 5.145
 (j 2  2 ) 3.208 4.219 4.432
 0.021 0.019 0.034
 0.026 0.034 0.025
 0.977 0.968 0.961
 0.804 0.852 0.813
Note: Predicted values obtained from estimates reported in Table 2.
26Table 4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates by di⁄erent





 0.6917 0.5714 0.3224
( 0.1902 ) ( 0.1498 ) ( 0.1021 )
(j2)
(j2) 0.9303 0.9519 0.8212
Married at least once:
 0.3132
( 0.0564 )
 0.8697 0.5531 0.3791
( 0.2866 ) ( 0.1670 ) ( 0.1187 )
(j2)
(j2) 0.9806 0.9168 0.8048
With family members under age 18:
 0.3507
( 0.1181 )
 0.7661 0.3552 0.3312
( 0.2762 ) ( 0.1964 ) ( 0.1375 )
(j2)
(j2) 0.9456 0.8636 0.7965
Married at least once and with family members under age 18:
 0.3494
( 0.1255 )
 0.7862 0.3516 0.3406
( 0.2780 ) ( 0.1970 ) ( 0.1438 )
(j2)
(j2) 0.9512 0.8622 0.7918
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Joint estimation on all years.
The speci￿cation is the same as in Table 2. The only di⁄erence between the estimates
are the homogeneity controls imposed on the estimation sample with respect to the
reported out of labor market characteristics.
27Table 5: Counterfactual Experiment 1: Isolate the
Impact of the Proportion of Prejudiced Employers
1985 1995 2005 y￿ y￿
 0.692 0.571 0.322 0.100 0.050
Di⁄erential (%):
 () -27.500 -22.659 -12.708 -3.918 -1.956
 (j 2 ) -21.973 -17.594 -9.292 -2.718 -1.342
 (j 2 ) 9.046 8.252 5.424 1.832 0.928
 8.709 7.947 5.229 1.768 0.896
 -18.706 -12.615 -4.813 -1.090 -0.510
 -53.150 -43.551 -24.103 -7.330 -3.648
Note: Results obtained by ￿xing all the remaining parameters except  to the
men￿ s values in 2005. For each value of  in this environment a new equilibrium is
computed and the corresponding values are reported in the table.
Table 6: Counterfactual Experiment 2: Isolate the
Impact of the Intensity of Discrimination
1985 1995 2005
b  () 9.953 8.809 5.530
 0.586 0.518 0.325
Di⁄erential (%):
 () -22.234 -19.836 -12.708
 (j 2 ) -13.556 -12.652 -9.292
 (j 2 ) 13.627 11.391 5.424
 13.099 10.957 5.229
 -10.543 -8.945 -4.813
 -39.461 -35.889 -24.103
Note: Results obtained by ￿xing all the remaining parameters except  to the
men￿ s values in 2005. Di⁄erent values of  for each year are obtained by matching
the estimated average discrimination intensity b  () while keeping  ￿xed at the 2005
value. For each value of  in this environment a new equilibrium is computed and the






































1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Conditional Differential
Figure 1: Gender Earnings Di⁄erential over Time: Point Estimates
and 95% Con￿dence Interval.
Note: Data are from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (March Supple-
ment) of the Current Population Survey (CPS). Results report the estimated coe¢ -
cient and the 95% con￿dence interval of a dummy =1 if the individual is a woman
in a regression of log hourly earnings on: (i) a constant and the dummy woman for
the unconditional di⁄erential case (top panel); (ii) a constant, the dummy woman,
three educational dummies, age linear and squared, a dummy for marital status and
a dummy for presence of children younger than 18 for the conditional di⁄erential case
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Year
Participation Rate Employment Rate
Figure 2: Gender Di⁄erential in Labor Market Participation: Partici-
pation Rate and Employment Rate conditioning on Participation.
Note: Data from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (March Supplement)
of the Current Population Survey (CPS). Results report the ratio ¬
 where
 means participation rate (solid line) and employment rate (dotted line); and 
denotes women and  men.
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